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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Patrick Segundo Oar appeals from his conviction for grand theft by
extortion.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Oar was in the Ada County Jail for a parole violation in April of 2014, and
happened to be housed with Cecilio Ponce–Alba. (Tr., p. 332, Ls. 5-14; p. 336,
1
L. 6-12; p. 542, L. 24 – p. 543, L. 9.) Ponce-Alba—also known as “Omar”—was

a drug trafficker distributing drugs from Mexico to California and Idaho who had
recently been arrested for methamphetamine trafficking. (Tr., p. 332, Ls. 9-14; p.
345, Ls. 9-15.) Omar was arrested after an associate of his helped police as a
confidential informant and testified against him.2 (Tr., p. 352, L. 9 – p. 353,
L. 16; p. 718. Ls. 15-20; p. 719, Ls. 11-13.)
At the time Oar and Omar were housed together the confidential
informant owed Omar $4,000 for drugs Omar had previously given her. (Tr.,
p. 718, L. 15 – p. 719, L. 7.) Oar learned about this debt, and requested the
assistance of Kathryn Blake in collecting it, allegedly on Omar’s behalf. (PSI,
p. 3; p. 892, Ls. 7-25; p. 894, L. 23 – p. 895, L. 8.)
Oar provided a letter to Blake to deliver to the confidential informant. (Tr.
p. 899, L. 25 – p. 900, L. 16; State’s Exhibit 11.) The letter stated it was written

1

Adopting the convention of Oar’s brief, this brief’s citations to transcripts will
refer to the single volume comprised of trial and sentencing hearing transcripts.

2

The transcript refers to the confidential informant as “M.D.”

1

by Omar, contained details about Omar that the confidential informant knew, and
instructed the informant to pay the debt that she owed. (Tr., p. 764, L. 10 – p.
765, L. 19; State’s Exhibit 11.) It also stated that “my [friends] in California are
really mad so I don’t want you guys to get in [trouble],” and threatened that “if I
sell the debt they will [probably double] the price with bad interest if not pay on
time.” (State’s Exhibit 11.) Blake approached the confidential informant late at
night at her work, stated she was there on behalf of Omar, and delivered the
threatening letter. (Tr., p. 720, L. 21 – p. 726, L. 16.)
Based on Oar’s threat3 the confidential informant—who stated she was
“terrified”—agreed to pay her debt and meet with Blake again. (Tr., p. 723, Ls. 18; p. 779, L. 7 – p. 780, L. 1.)

But before she did, she contacted law

enforcement, who provided her with marked currency and directed her to transfer
the money while recording the conversation with a wire. (Tr., p. 465, L. 5 – p.
473, L. 17; p. 730, L. 25 – p. 732, L. 17.) The confidential informant gave the
money to Blake who was then arrested. (PSI, p. 3.)
Oar was indicted on one count of conspiracy to commit grand theft by
extortion and one count of grand theft by extortion. (R., pp. 9-12.) The state
also filed an Information Part II against Oar charging a persistent violator
enhancement. (R., p. 29-30.) After a joint trial with co-conspirator Blake, Oar

3

Oar concedes on appeal that “there was sufficient evidence to support the
jury’s finding that Mr. Oar (with the assistance of Ms. Blake) threatened [the
victim] with future violence if she did not deliver money….” (Appellant’s brief, p.
7.) For ease of reference this brief will thus refer to the threatening letter
supplied by Oar, delivered by Oar’s accomplice at Oar’s instruction, as “Oar’s
threat.”

2

was found guilty on both counts and admitted the enhancement. (Tr., p. 1173, L.
25 – p. 1174, L. 4; p. 1175, L. 10 – p. 1176, L. 24.)
The district court imposed concurrent 17-year unified sentences on both
counts, fixing five years.

(Tr., p. 1218, Ls. 18-25.)

(R., pp. 251-254.)

3

Oar timely appealed.

ISSUES
Oar states the issues on appeal as:
1. Should this Court vacate Mr. Oar’s conviction for grand theft by extortion
as there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction?
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an excessive
sentence in light of the mitigating factors that exist in this case?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 4)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1. Has Oar failed to show that there was insufficient evidence to support his
conviction for grand theft by extortion?
2. Has Oar failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in sentencing
him?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
Oar Has Failed To Show That There Was Insufficient Evidence To Support His
Conviction For Grand Theft By Extortion
A.

Introduction
On appeal, Oar argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the

jury’s finding that he was guilty of grand theft by extortion. He argues that “the
undisputed evidence in this case demonstrates conclusively that it was Detective
Bruner who compelled, induced, or caused M.D. to deliver the money”—and not
Oar.

(Appellant’s brief, p. 5-8.)

This argument fails, as there was ample

evidence that Oar’s wrongful threat compelled or induced M.D. to deliver the
money. Consequently, Oar fails to show that there was insufficient evidence to
support his conviction for grand theft by extortion.
B.

Standard Of Review
“Appellate review of the sufficiency of evidence is limited in scope.” State

v. Marsh, 153 Idaho 360, 365, 283 P.3d 107, 112 (Ct. App. 2011). Idaho’s
appellate courts will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon a jury
verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); State v.
Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992). In conducting this review
the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to the
credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292,

5

955 P.2d at 607; State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 104, 822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct.
App. 1991). Furthermore, the facts and inferences to be drawn from those facts
are construed “in the light most favorable to the prosecution.” Miller, 131 Idaho
at 292, 955 P.2d at 607; State v. Hart, 112 Idaho 759, 761, 735 P.2d 1070, 1072
(Ct. App. 1987).
C.

There Was Sufficient Evidence That Oar Wrongfully Compelled The
Victim To Deliver Funds, And Therefore, Sufficient Evidence To Support
Oar’s Conviction For Grand Theft By Extortion
Idaho Code § 18-2403(1) sets forth that “[a] person steals property and

commits theft when, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate
the same to himself or to a third person, he wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds
such property from an owner thereof.” In particular, “[a] person obtains property
by extortion when he compels or induces another person to deliver such property
to himself or to a third person by means of instilling in him a fear that, if the
property is not so delivered, the actor or another will: 1. Cause physical injury to
some person in the future . . . .” I.C. § 18-2403(2)(e).
No Idaho case directly addresses the issue that Oar raises on appeal—
that is, whether a threat is extortionate when it precedes a police-assisted
delivery of funds. Oar disagrees and cites State v. Reinoehl, which appears to
contain a similar fact pattern as this case. 70 Idaho 361, 363, 218 P.2d 865,
865-66 (1949), reh’g granted (1950).

But Oar overstates his case when he

contends that the Reinoehl Court “[held] that, under the then-existing statutory
scheme, attempted extortion occurs where a victim delivers property to another
based upon a motivation other than the threat made by the defendant.”

6

(Appellant’s brief, p. 7, n. 5.) The Reinoehl Court did not make such a specific
holding, and in fact limited its opinion on rehearing to addressing “only one” of
the “numerous alleged errors” in that case. Reinoehl, 70 Idaho at 365, 218 P.2d
at 867.

The Reinoehl court only addressed the defendant’s jurisdictional

argument that he was “charged with attempted extortion by verbal threats as
defined by [the then-existing extortion statute], and should have been tried in the
probate court for which reason the probate court had no jurisdiction to hold him
for trial in the district court.” Id. The court held that because the extortion statute
existing at the time explicitly provided a misdemeanor penalty for attempted
extortion, the general attempt provisions were not applicable, and therefore the
standard misdemeanor punishment provision would apply instead. Id. at 365-67,
218 P.2d at 867-68.
Thus, while the Reinoehl Court considered a case with similar facts, it
ruled on a wholly separate legal question of whether the general attempt statute
or the attempt statute specific to extortion applied to the charge. Unlike Oar,
Reinoehl was charged with attempted extortion. The Reinoehl Court did not
consider whether that attempt charge was more or less appropriate than a
completed offense charge, nor did it opine on the elements of extortion, and it
did not hold that “attempted extortion occurs where a victim delivers property to
another based upon a motivation other than the threat made by the defendant.”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 7, n. 5.) Because Reinoehl was limited to the question of
what statute applied to the crime charged, it does not control the issue in this
case.

7

However, other jurisdictions with similar extortion statutes have addressed
the issue of police-assisted delivery of funds in this context. For example, in
State v. Marsh, the Court of Appeals of Oregon examined an extortion statute
nearly identical to Idaho’s:
ORS 164.075(1) provides: “A person commits theft by extortion
when he compels or induces another person to deliver property to
himself or to a third person by means of instilling in him a fear that,
if the property is not so delivered, the actor or another will in the
future: (a) Cause physical injury to some person . . . .”
603 P.2d 1212, 1214 (Or. App. 1979). There, the Marsh Court considered an
appellant’s argument that the district court erred by denying his motion for a
directed verdict, because “there was no evidence that the manager of the drug
store was motivated by fear in turning the money over to [the defendant’s
accomplice.]” Id. The defendant contended “because the police were called and
the money was given to [the defendant’s accomplice] at the police officer’s
direction the most he can be guilty of is attempted theft by extortion.” Id. The
court disagreed, holding that:
The jury was instructed on the elements of theft by extortion and on
the lesser included offense of attempted theft by extortion.
Defendant did not assign the giving of these instructions as error.
Assuming that the subjective state of mind of the victim is an
element of the offense it was a factual determination for the jury as
to whether he was in part motivated by fear of an explosion in
giving the money to [the defendant’s accomplice]. The jury could
infer that the store manager called the police and ultimately
surrendered the money because of a concern that there was
actually a bomb in the store which would be detonated if the money
was not delivered. We cannot say, as a matter of law, that the
participation of the police in marking the money and directing the
manager to give it to Merrill was only an attempted theft. The
motion for directed verdict of acquittal was properly denied.
Id. at 1215.

8

The Supreme Court of Utah reached a similar conclusion in State v.
Prince after examining the then-existing extortion statute:
“Extortion is the obtaining of property from another with his
consent, induced by a wrongful use of force or fear, or under color
of official right.” Section 8321, so far as applicable here, reads:
“Fear, such as will constitute extortion, may be induced by a threat,
either: 1. To do an unlawful injury to the person ….”
284 P. 108, 109 (Utah 1930).

In that case, the defendant contended “the

evidence conclusively shows [the victim], in paying the money, was not actuated
by either force or fear, but by another and different motive, that of entrapping the
defendant at the suggestion of the county attorney.” Id. The court disagreed
and noted the evidence that the victim there was “actuated by fear” based on the
defendant’s extortionate threats, which the court considered a “controlling factor
in the payment of the money, notwithstanding [the victim’s] conversations with
the officers and their activity in his behalf.” Id. at 110. The Prince Court further
found that law enforcement did nothing to “entice or encourage” the crime, the
defendant “was at all times the moving party,” and the victim was so afraid that
he lost sleep and made complaints to law enforcement. Id. Accordingly, the
Prince Court concluded:
From the whole record we are unable to say that the evidence
conclusively shows that the fear which [the victim] admittedly
suffered before he visited the sheriff had been so overcome and
dissipated that when the money was paid he was no longer
actuated or controlled primarily by fear induced by threats. On the
other hand, we think the jury could well have found, as they did,
that fear induced by threats was the controlling factor. [The victim]
said he was afraid when he went to Stella’s house, and the facts
and circumstances surrounding the transaction bear out his
statement that he was still in fear. The defendant had done all that
he could toward the accomplishment of the crime of extortion. His
unlawful intent was manifest. The threats to kill had been made,

9

not once, but several times. He demanded the money on the day it
was paid, and when paid accepted it and put it in his pocket. So far
as defendant knew, the extortion was complete. His wicked
purpose was accomplished. There was sufficient evidence to show
that fear induced by threats was the controlling factor in the
payment of the money.
Id.
Based on the evidence presented at trial the jury found Oar guilty of grand
theft by extortion. (Tr., p. 1174, Ls. 1-4.)4 The jury did so correctly because
substantial evidence supported the elements of grand theft by extortion. The

4

And Oar assured the district court that he would not be “overtly arguing” that
police intervention showed the extortion was not completed but only attempted:
THE COURT: I’m concerned and I think [the attempt jury
instruction] needs to be back in for this very reason: Either you
argue or the jury on their own says, well, the instruction says the
defendant did so by creating a fear in M.D., well, she didn’t turn the
money over because she had this fear, she turned the money over
because it was part of this sting. But if she originally had the fear
and the only thing that keeps her from turning it over is the cops
are involved and if the jury wants to otherwise acquit her because
of that break in the connection, it seems to me that they could still
find them guilty of attempted extortion.
So I would be inclined to put it back in for that reason, not so much
because it was somebody else’s money, I think it’s clear it doesn’t
have to be her money, but I’m concerned about this connection that
seems to be implicit in the statute that turning over the money is
because of the fear instilled and the potential the jury might say
well, she didn’t turn it over because she was afraid she turned it
over because she was working with law enforcement at this point.
[OAR’S TRIAL COUNSEL]: I guess I don’t have a strong feeling, I
suppose, against that if the state is going to ask for it. It’s not going
to be obviously—I can see how what I’ve just said might imply that
sort of defense but it’s certainly not something I would be overtly
arguing.
(Tr., p. 936, L. 14 – p. 937, L. 15.)
10

plain text of Idaho’s extortion statute does not require the state prove any
particular mental state or subjective motivation on the part of the extorted victim;
rather, the state was simply required to prove that the fear-instilling threat
compelled or induced the victim to turn over money to Oar’s accomplice.
I.C. § 18-2403.
The victim here testified that she received the threatening letter from Oar’s
accomplice who stated she “was there on behalf of Omar.” (Tr., p. 721, Ls. 1417; p. 722, Ls. 18-22.)

Before reading the letter the victim informed the

accomplice that a payment plan would not be necessary because she would be
paying the full amount. (Tr., p. 723, Ls. 1-8.) After reading the letter, the victim
testified that she was terrified and called Detective Bruner right away.
(Tr., p. 779, L. 3 – p. 780, L. 1.) The victim stated that she called the detective
for a couple of reasons: “it seemed a little bit threatening, intimidating, and also I
didn’t have the money and I just needed to talk to him about it.” (Tr., p. 728, 16.) Thereafter, Detective Bruner provided funds to the victim which she gave to
Oar’s accomplice. (Tr., p. 465, L. 5 – p. 473, L. 17; p. 730, L. 25 – p. 732, L. 17.)
All told, there is substantial evidence that the payment was compelled or induced
by Oar’s threat, because it was the reason the victim agreed to pay the debt,
sought out assistance in paying the debt, and paid it.
Moreover, even if the state was required to adduce evidence of the
victim’s motivation, it did so. If this Court were to, in the words of the Marsh
Court, “assum[e] that the subjective state of mind of the victim is an element of
the offense,” it would find substantial evidence of the victim’s mental state and
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motivation in the record. Marsh, 603 P.2d at 1215. The victim testified that upon
contacting Oar’s accomplice she was anxious and nervous because she “did
owe [Omar] money and I did assist law enforcement to set him up.” (Tr., p. 721,
L. 24 – p. 722, L. 5.) When asked why she agreed to pay the full amount she
testified she “wasn’t sure if anyone really was aware of my involvement in Omar
getting arrested and was trying to keep it that way.” (Tr., p. 724, Ls. 2-12.) The
victim testified that she had concerns for her physical wellbeing and safety, that
the letter appeared threatening and terrified her, and that when Oar’s accomplice
approached her, her “biggest fear just walked through the door.” (Tr., p. 727,
L. 25 – p. 728, L. 16; p. 776, L. 24 – p. 777, L. 6; p. 779, L. 3 – p. 780, L. 1.)
Lastly, when reflecting on the contents of the letter, the victim testified she
recalled Omar’s connections with “people he worked with in Southern California
and Mexico” and with respect to drug debtors, Omar’s remark “you know they cut
your head off or something”—the victim testified that she had “that kind of image
in my head.” (Tr., p. 777, L. 13 – p. 778, L. 1.)
Thus, much like the victims in Marsh and Prince, there was substantial
evidence here that the victim agreed to pay her debt due to the fear instilled in
her by the threat. And there is substantial evidence that Oar’s threat was the
“actuating motivation” for the victim to contact the police and ultimately give the
money to Oar’s accomplice. Based on the record there is no reason to think that
without the threat the victim would have reached out to law enforcement on a
whim to organize a sting operation, or voluntarily contacted the person whom she
testified against in order to catch up on drug debt arrears. Consequently, even

12

assuming the victim’s state of mind is an element of the crime, the jury had
substantial evidence that the victim was afraid of the threat, primarily motivated
by it, and delivered the funds to Oar’s accomplice as a result.
Oar argues that “Detective Bruner compelled, induced, or caused M.D. to
deliver the money to Ms. Blake, not Mr. Oar” and concludes that “[a]s such, there
was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Mr. Oar was guilty of
grand theft by extortion.”

(Appellant’s brief, p. 8.)

But this conclusion fails

because there is no evidence that the victim was afraid of the detective,
threatened by the detective, harmed by the detective, physically forced to
participate in the payment, or even told by the detective that she “would receive
consideration or a benefit for making contact with him” about the threat.
(Tr., p. 729, Ls. 5-19.) At most, the detective “directed” the victim to make the
payment to Oar’s accomplice—or in other words, he asked her to.

(See

Appellant’s brief, p. 7; Tr., p. 468, L. 25 – p. 469, L. 3; p. 469, Ls. 14-16; p. 663,
Ls. 1-7, 20-22; p. 698, L. 5 – p. 699, L. 2; p. 730, Ls. 3-6.)
Oar’s argument runs aground here, because if a detective’s request that
the victim pay funds equates to compulsion, then Oar’s request that she pay
funds is at least equally compulsive. And, of course, Oar’s request came with
additional incentives: it arrived as a collection letter promising “bad interest” in
the event of late payment, allegedly penned by a man involved in international
drug trade, whom the victim had recently testified against, and to whom the
victim owed thousands of dollars, and whose salient stories regarding drug debts
involved decapitated debtors. (State’s Ex. 11; Tr. p. 345, Ls. 8-15; p. 373, L. 19
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– p. 374, L. 23; p. 718, L. 15 – p. 719, L. 5; p. 719, Ls. 11-13; p. 777, L. 13 – p.
778, L. 1.) Accepting Oar’s premise that Detective Bruner “compelled” the victim
with non-threatening requests or directions can only lead to the conclusion that
she was likewise compelled by Oar’s threatening request—but by significantly
greater degree.
Oar’s argument therefore fails because even if he has successfully
identified some evidence of law enforcement compulsion, or evidence that the
victim had mixed motivations, Oar has not shown an absence of evidence that
the victim was primarily compelled by Oar’s threat.

Here, regardless of law

enforcement’s involvement, there is substantial evidence that the victim agreed
to pay, contacted the detective, and participated in the payment in the first place
because of the threat. Thus, Oar’s claim the jury verdict is not supported by the
evidence fails.
II.
Oar Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Sentencing Him
A.

Introduction
Oar argues that “in light of the mitigating factors that are present in this

case” the district court imposed an excessive sentence. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 910.) This argument fails, as the district court considered Oar’s history, the facts
of this case, and any mitigating factors, and imposed a sentence that was
appropriate. Oar has accordingly failed to show that the district court abused its
discretion in sentencing him.

14

B.

Standard Of Review
The imposition of a particular sentence is within the discretion of the trial

court. State v. Arambula, 97 Idaho 627, 630, 550 P.2d 130, 133 (1976).
C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Sentencing Oar
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant is required to

establish that the sentence is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136
Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho
831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).

Oar must therefore show that his sentence is

excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38
P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable if appropriate to achieve the primary goal
of protecting society, and any or all of the related sentencing goals of deterrence,
rehabilitation, or retribution. State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707,
710 (Ct. App. 1982) (citing State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730
(1978)). In deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a
reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ. Toohill, 103 Idaho at
568, 650 P.2d at 710.
Here, the district court’s sentence was reasonable under any view of the
facts. The court began sentencing Oar by explicitly citing the Toohill factors.
(Tr., p. 1215, Ls. 14-21.)

It noted that it had considered “the nature of the

offense and the character of the offender, as well as the information in mitigation
and in aggravation.” (Tr., p. 1215, Ls. 15-17.) The district court found that Oar
put the victim and his co-defendant in danger, and it noted Oar’s “lack of honesty
and sense of taking responsibility for conduct in this case.” (Tr., p. 1216, Ls. 9-
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14.) And the district court found that Oar’s conduct here was “consistent” with
his prior “primarily predatory” history as outlined by this Court in State v. Oar.
(Tr., p. 1215, L. 25 – p. 1215, L. 16.) This Court recited Oar’s history as follows:
Second, the district court considered Oar’s character. The district
court was particularly concerned with Oar’s “ego and tremendous
arrogance.” It seemed to the district court that Oar had potential,
but believed that he could “con everyone” and that Oar’s history
showed that he had “a willingness to take advantage of others and
in addition to put others in danger.” The Court noted that the
defendant had never “fully and honestly take[n] responsibility for his
conduct” and had been dishonest with the district court.
The district court also reviewed each of the four goals of
sentencing. When considering protection of society, the district
court stated that Oar’s history and actions in this case showed he
would use his intelligence to take advantage of others. When
considering deterrence, the district court stated that it was
concerned that Oar must realize that his predatory conduct would
result in jail time. When considering rehabilitation, the district court
stated that although Oar showed potential, he failed to take
advantage of “several efforts for him to be rehabilitated including a
withheld judgment in 1980, probation in 1986, 1990, and 1993, and
a retained jurisdiction in 1991.” Finally, when considering
retribution, the district court found Oar’s conduct reprehensible,
especially because he had not taken responsibility for it.
State v. Oar, 129 Idaho 337, 343, 924 P.2d 599, 605 (1996) (holding that Oar’s
sentence for two counts of sexual battery of a minor child was reasonable in light
of the Toohill factors). Lastly, the district court here noted that this crime was
committed while Oar was in custody; “he was still reaching out to cause harm to
the community” and trying to hatch an extortion scheme, potentially placing
others in danger, despite efforts to protect the community by incarcerating him.
(Tr., p. 1217, Ls. 2-7; p. 1217, L. 18 – p. 1218, L. 7.)
The district court considered all of this, and “all the mitigating factors,” but
still concluded that “in light of the need to protect society, as well as the need for
16

retribution and punishment, because this was the latest in a number of offenses,”
a significant penalty was warranted. (Tr., p. 1217, Ls. 8-18; p. 1218, Ls. 8-17.) It
accordingly sentenced Oar to an aggregate term of 17 years, with 5 years fixed,
on both counts. (Tr., p. 1218, Ls. 18-25.) In light of Oar’s history, the facts of
this case, and the relevant sentencing factors, this was entirely reasonable.
Oar’s burden is to show that the district court’s sentence was
unreasonable. He has not done so. Oar cites his admission he made a terrible
decision, and claims to take full responsibility for his actions.

(PSI, p. 4;

Appellant’s brief, p. 9.) He also points to his family’s and community members’
letters of support. (PSI, pp. 84-91; Appellant’s brief, p. 9.) But the district court
indicated that it reviewed the PSI, which includes the letters, and considered all
the mitigating factors in crafting its sentence. (Tr., p. 1215, Ls. 14-25; p. 1217,
Ls. 14-18.) The district court concluded that even in light of mitigating factors a
significant penalty was warranted. Given the facts and Oar’s history this was a
reasonable exercise of discretion, and Oar has not shown otherwise.

He

therefore fails to establish that the district court erred in sentencing him.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the
district court.
DATED this 26th day of July, 2016.

/s/ Kale D. Gans___________________
KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
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